This paper examines under what circumstances the market-based compensation scheme is effective in inducing managers' incentives. We combine the optimal contract theory with the market microstructure literature and endogenize both the optimal compensation scheme and the stock market equilibrium. We analytically show that the incentive pay works better in a more efficient (or more informative) stock market. Empirical tests justify our model prediction. Using residual analyst coverage as one proxy for market informativeness, we find that the coverage is negatively related to the compensation level and positively to the pay-for-performance sensitivity, suggesting that an efficient market induces managerial incentives as well as structures their behavior.
Introduction
Market-based compensation schemes have gained huge popularity in the past two decades.
The use of stock grants and stock options as well as other forms of incentive pay has become a common practice of Corporate America's compensation package for both firm executives and non-executive employees (Murphy 1999) . It has been argued that performance-related compensation schemes help discipline managers to act in the investors' interest. While much of this literature still views performance-related pay arrangements as a (partial) remedy to the agency problem, the recent corporate debacles in the U.S. (Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, and etc.), including the most recent drama around former NYSE Chairman Dick Grasso's $140 million retirement pay package, has rekindled the debate on the effectiveness of performancebased pay arrangements. 1 The debate so far has boiled down to the following fundamental issues: Does incentive pay really play an effective role in aligning the interest of executives with that of shareholders? If yes, under what conditions will the performance pay be more effective? If no, why has it been employed in the first place?
2 Naturally this work is motivated by the debate on the effectiveness of performancerelated compensation schemes. While we acknowledge the importance of understanding why firms would adopt an output-based compensation scheme, 3 we specifically focus, both theoretically and empirically, on the cross-sectional variation in executives' payfor-performance sensitivities when compensation contracts are written on a variety of performance measures including stock prices. By identifying the conditions under which the performance-related pay would be more effective in inducing optimal managerial efforts, this paper also sheds lights on the following issue: When should a firm adopt output-based incentives?
1 See, e.g., Financial Times, July 31, 2002 ; The Wall Street Journal, various issues in early September 2003.
2 For example, a number of researchers have recognized that some features of pay arrangements seem to reflect managerial rent seeking rather than the provision of efficient incentives (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; and Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 ). It has been argued that the design of compensation schemes is also one part of the agency problem.
3 See Lazear (2001), Oyer (2003) , and Prendergast (2002) .
In this paper, we attempt to deepen our understanding of the effectiveness of performancerelated compensation contracts by developing a model that combines both the classical principal-agent model and the market microstructure literature and bringing its predictions to data. Our model is rooted in the seminal works of Stiglitz (1976, 1980) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) , Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) and the vast market microstructure literature, all of which have shown that stock markets aggregate information and stock prices reveal valuable private information to the investing public through stock trading.
We start with the traditional principal-agent model in which the principal (shareholders)
designs an optimal incentive contract to induce the agent's (manager's) best effort. Inspired by the findings on the role of stock markets and trading mechanisms in producing information, we build into the principal-agent model an additional element to fully capture the contracting environment: The principal can leverage the information contained in stock prices to design the compensation contract and structure managerial incentives.
We then define a rational-expectation equilibrium where both the optimal compensation scheme and the stock market equilibrium are endogenously determined. Potential traders form rational expectations on the firm decisions and then engage in stock trading. The stock market equilibrium is characterized by the stock price, the number of informed traders and these traders' bidding strategies. Through stock trading, the stock market aggregates all sorts of information (both public and private) and conveys the information to the investing public. The principal thence utilizes the informative stock prices to design a more efficient compensation contract.
Our main thesis is that the features of market microstructure affect the number of investors who decide to become informed, and the endogenous number of informed investors influences through trading the amount of informational content in stock prices. Since the principal has to utilize the information contained in stock prices to extract information on the manager's effort, the heterogeneity in performance-based compensation contracts may be caused by the heterogeneity in market microstructure. Therefore, the key prediction of our model suggests that the incentive pay might work more effectively in a more efficient (or more we conduct various empirical tests and justify the prediction that pay-for-performance sensitivities increase with the stock market informativeness.
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In particular, we find a negative relationship between coverage and compensation level and a positive relationship between coverage and the pay-for-performance sensitivity. The negative relationship between coverage and compensation level suggests that the market informativeness helps to curb the level of executive pay. A more informative market makes it easier to exert pressure on managers, ensuring that they do not expropriate rents from shareholders in the form of excess compensation. The empirical analysis thus implies that an efficient market both induces managerial incentives and structures their behavior.
Our paper makes several incremental contributions to the literature. Firstly, we explicitly model the compensation contract conditional on informative stock prices, and we directly, 4 Residual analyst coverage is obtained by regressing the log value of one plus the number of unique analysts following a firm against a variety of firm-specific variables such as firm size, market-to-book ratio, turnover ratio, NASDAQ dummy, and leverage ratio as well as industry and year dummies. Refer to Section (3.2) for details.
rather than indirectly through some intermediate channels, show that the compensation scheme works more effectively in one environment over another. Thus, our paper pinpoints the importance of fully capturing the contracting environment (e.g., whether the firm operates in a more informative market) in understanding the effectiveness of incentive pay.
Secondly, we identify another important underlying economic determinant of the pay-forperformance sensitivity, even after controlling for the impact of various previously identified factors. 5 The analyst coverage variable proxies for the rate of information transmission and is directly related to the market informativeness. Thirdly, our paper is one of few fresh attempts that apply the market microstructure framework to the corporate finance area. 6 Incorporating market microstructure into the principal-agent model better captures the contracting environment under study and enriches our understanding of the effectiveness of incentive pay.
In a similar vein, Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) also combine the market microstructure with the compensation contract theory. They show that stock prices incorporate performance information that cannot be readily extracted from the firm's accounting data and that the principal can leverage this piece of information from stock prices to design the optimal compensation contract. Our paper differs from Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) in various aspects, though. We reach the same conclusion through different channels.
Holmstrom and Tirole essentially use the firm's ownership structure to influence the market informativeness through its effect on market liquidity. They postulate that a decrease in insiders' concentrated ownership increases market liquidity which further improves market informativeness and hence the performance evaluation. Also, they assume that there is only one informed trader (or in their term, speculator) in the market. They do not model 5 Nowadays, it is well agreed upon that there are an enormous amount of cross-sectional variations in individual incentive measures such as pay-for-performance sensitivities (Hall and Liebman, 1998 ). An incomplete list of variables that help explain this heterogeneity include: firm size (Baker and Hall, 2002; and Schaefer, 1998) ; return volatility (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) ; growth opportunity (Hartzell and Starks, 2002) ; CEO reputation (Milbourn, 2002) ; industry and year effects (Ely, 1991; and Murphy, 1999) . 6 Exceptions include Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Liu and Qi (2002) , and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) . the speculator's market-entry decision. In contrast, we rely on the equilibrium number of informed traders to affect the market informativeness. An increase in the number of informed traders enhances the informational content of stock prices and hence performance evaluation.
We assume many potential informed traders in our setup, and we endogenize their marketentry decisions which depend on their reservation utility and the market microstructure characteristics.
In Holmstrom and Tirole's framework, the concentrated ownership, a key component of corporate decisions, directly affects the market liquidity which further has an important impact on the corporate decision. There may be a built-in endogeneity issue in empirically testing their model predictions. In our model, the number of informed traders depends only on the exogenous market microstructure characteristics. 7 The endogeneity problem is thus less of a concern in our paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model and characterizes the stock market equilibrium and the optimal incentive contract; Section 3 discusses the data and the empirical methodology; Section 4 presents the empirical results; and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model 2.1 Economy
Sequence of Events
We begin by studying a fairly general single-period model with two points of time, indexed t=0, 1. The period is further divided into several stages. The model unfolds as follows:
At the initial point of time 0, a publicly-held firm is established with a random terminal 7 See either equation (13) or equation (A. 1).
payoff at time 1:
where e is the effort level that the potential manager would privately choose and e cannot be contracted on; δ is a zero-mean, normally distributed random variable with variances, V δ .
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The shares are issued on the firm's future cash flow.
At stage 1, the firm owner ("the Principal") hires one manager ("the Agent") and a compensation contract that is linear in the firm's terminal payoff, r, and its stock price, P , is signed. 9 The contract takes the following form:
where a represents the fixed salary, b 1 and b 2 capture the sensitivities of the manager's compensation relative to the firm's terminal payoff, r and its stock price, P , respectively.
Given the compensation contract, the manager chooses an effort level e ∈ [0, ∞) which is not observable.
The compensation contract in equation (2) deserves a careful explanation. Obviously, it deviates from much of the literature where the compensation contract is either written on the end-of-period payoffr (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; and Murphy, 1999) or on the stock price (e.g., Milbourn, 2002) or price-related variables like market value (e.g., Baker and Hall, 2002; Jin, 2002; and Schaefer, 1998 ). In our model, we fixate executive compensation on bothr and P for two reasons. First, as pointed out by Bushman and Smith (2001) , in numerous studies that regress measures of executive pay on measures of performance to estimate the sensitivity of pay to performance, the actual performance measures used in the compensation plans are unknown. Given that, it is somewhat ad hoc to argue whether the principal should write the compensation contract on the stock price or the end-of-period payoff. Second, the compensation contract in equation (2) is based on Holmstrom's (1979) "informativeness principle"which states that any signal providing incremental information regarding performance should be included in the contract.
Since our model intends to illuminate the informational role of stock price in designing an optimal incentive scheme, it is natural for us to include it in the contract. At time 1, the payoff is realized, the incentive contract is honored, and the firm is liquidated. The resulting liquidation proceeds are distributed between the manager and the principal.
Agents and Preferences
All categories of agents are risk-neutral except the manager. The manager is the only riskaverse agent in our model. Her preference is represented by a negative exponential utility function over her compensation W with the (absolute) risk aversion coefficient γ. Her cost of choosing the effort e is denoted as C(e) = 1 2 ke 2 . The cost is measured in money and it is independent of the manager's wealth. The manager's evaluation of the normally distributed income W , given her choice of effort e, can then be represented in the certainty equivalent 10 It is possible to add correlations among the signals observed by the various traders, but doing so only complicates the analysis and adds little additional intuition. measure as follows:
In our model, the risk-neutral principal owns the firm. We assume that the principal maximizes the expected value of her wealth. Note that several recent studies such as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) have put together a strong argument that managers may leverage their power to influence the design of compensation plans for their own benefit. In this paper, we assume away this kind of managerial power in compensation designing for two reasons. First, we want to adhere to the traditional principal-agent framework in which the principal provides optimal incentives for the manager to maximize the shareholder's value (Holmstrom, 1979; and Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987 ).
Thus, we can demonstrate the incremental contributions of this paper to the extant literature.
Second, the key ingredient of our paper is that we model how the stock market efficiency affects the effectiveness of the performance-related pay. If the stock market is efficient enough, the investors would be able to see through the managerial power in compensation designing and price it accordingly.
Trading Mechanism
In our model, the stock market opens and operates in stage 2. Extending from Kyle (1985) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) , and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , we adopt a model with many potential risk-neutral informed traders and a competitive risk-neutral market maker. Informed trader i receives her private signal δ + i at stage 2. As in Kyle (1985) , both the informed and uninformed traders submit their order flows to the market maker and we restrict the traders' bidding strategies to be linear. In particular, informed trader i submits a market order that is linear in her signal, β(δ + i ). Also, we assume that the total liquidity demand in the market is z and z is a zero-mean, normally distributed variable with variance V z . The market maker cannot distinguish whether an order comes from an informed trader or from a liquidity trader. After observing the total order flow, the market maker sets a competitive stock price to break even, that is, her expected profit conditional on the total order flow is zero.
Assume for now that there are N traders who possess the costly information on δ and trade on the stock. Since there are N informed traders and z liquidity demand, the total order flow observed by the market maker is given by ω = N βδ
The competitive market maker, given the aggregate order flow ω, sets a price such that P = E [ r|ω]. 
A Rational-expectation Equilibrium
In this model, information asymmetry comes from the fact that the principal cannot see the managerial effort level e. Therefore, she is not able to tell how much of the realized payoffr is attributed to the manager's effort e and how much to the random shock δ. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , the stock price P , contains performance information that cannot be readily extracted from the firm's payoff data.
Given this one-period economy, we focus our attention on a rational-expectation equilibrium where the stock market traders trade on the private signals about δ they acquire.
In equilibrium, the players in the real sector (the principal and the manager) use the information contained in the stock price and the realized payoff to make decisions. One important part of the definition of the equilibrium is that both the real sector and the stock market are at equilibrium during the same period. Thus, the equilibrium described in the model clearly characterizes the linkage between the stock market and the real sector.
A rigorous definition of the rational-expectation equilibrium is given as:
11 Much of the literature defines the stock price as P = E [( r − W )|ω]. We ignore the manager's compensation W in our price function for two reasons: first, given that W in our model is linear in bothr and P , including it in the price function does not change the information content of the stock price. That is, the stock prices based on the two different pricing functions are informationally equivalent. However, dealing with the one defined in our model is analytically much easier; second, as shown in Jensen and Murphy (1990) , the average CEO's firm-related wealth changes only by $3.25 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Thus, practically speaking, the impact of W on the stock price is minimal.
Definition 1 A rational-expectation equilibrium is characterized by a set of parameters
2 , e * ), the stock price P , the trader's bidding strategy coefficient β * , and a number of informed traders N * such that:
(1) The stock market is at equilibrium where N * investors collect the costly private signals to become informed about δ, β * corresponds to the traders' optimal bidding strategy, and the stock price P is optimally determined by the risk-neutral market maker conditional on the total order flow from informed and liquidity traders.
(2) The principal designs the compensation contract W = a * + b * 1r + b * 2 P which solves the following problem such that both the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are satisfied:
2 P , the manager chooses e * to solve the problem:
Stock Market Equilibrium
We first solve the stock market equilibrium. Suppose that there are N traders who possess the costly information on δ and trade. As in Kyle (1985) , informed trader i submits an order that is linear in her signal, β(δ + i ). With z liquidity demand, the total order flow observed by the market maker is
The market maker, after observing the total order flow, ω, sets a linear price schedule of the form P = e + λω (Kyle, 1985) .
Using standard techniques, we get Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the value of λ is given by
where
Proof. Let the order of a particular trader i with costly information δ + i be denoted by
x. This informed trader maximizes
Assume that all N informed traders follow the same strategy and submit the order in the form β(δ + i ), then equation (6) becomes
Solving out the first-order condition, we find that x is given in the form β(δ + i ), where
For the symmetric Nash equilibrium, β is the same across all informed traders. From equation (8), we have
Since P = e + λω = e + E(δ|ω), and λ is the coefficient in the regression of δ on ω,
i + z into the above expression for λ and in turn, substituting for β from equation (9) gives
Letting Γ =
we have equation (4) in the text. Q.E.D.
Note that in the above expression, λ captures the market depth in the stock market.
It is increasing in the information variance V δ . The intuition is that as the variance of the information increases, the information itself becomes more valuable, which, in turn, makes the market less liquid since the uninformed traders are avoiding the market. Equation (9) and equation (10) imply that
Using standard market-microstructure techniques, we calculate each informed trader's expected profit as
The potential traders will make an effort to search for the private signal and actively trade if and only if the expected profit from doing so, ER, exceeds their reservation value,
µ.
12 Therefore, the equilibrium number of informed traders, N , is determined by
Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain Lemma 2 The number of informed traders, N , (1) decreases as the investors' reservation value µ about becoming informed increases, (2) increases as the volatility of the firm's cash flow V δ increases, and (3) increases as the volatility of the liquidity trading V z increases.
Let ρ ≡ Corr(δ, P ), given the linear price schedule P = e + λω and Lemma 1, we have
Lemma 3
The correlation coefficient between δ and stock price P , ρ, and the variance of the stock price, V ar(P ), are given by
and
Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
We also have
Lemma 4
The (inverse) informativeness of the stock price P is given by
Proof. Given the linear price schedule P = e + λω, we have V ar(δ|P ) = V ar(δ|λω).
Thus,
Q.E.D.
Generally, a conditional variance is no greater than an unconditional variance.
Equation (16) That is, all the uncertainty about the cash flow and the terminal payoff is removed, and the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent disappears. From equation (16), we claim:
Proposition 1 As the number of informed traders increases, the market becomes more informative, and the stock price is more valuable. 
Optimal Compensation Contract
As shown above, an attractive and convenient feature of our model is that the manager's contract and actions have no effect on investors' trading activity. Thus, we can separate the analysis of market equilibrium from the analysis of optimal contracting (see also Holmstrom and Tirole 1993). This feature helps us illustrate the information production role of the stock market through stock trading and market microstructure, which can be utilized by the principal to design a more effective compensation contract to induce the manager's effort.
We can now easily set up the principal's problem as follows:
where W is the reservation utility to the manager.
The manager's compensation, as specified in (2), is a linear function of both the realized payoff,r, and the stock price P . Rather than dealing with W = a + b 1r + b 2 P directly, the analysis of contracting becomes analytically much easier if we transform the wage function into the following equivalent normalized function:
Note that equation (19) is a linear transformation based on hypothesized equilibrium values. One benefit of dealing withP rather than P is thatP is a zero-mean and normally distributed variable. As we will show later, given that the mean ofP is zero, it is much easier to analytically illuminate its Stiglitz (1976 Stiglitz ( , 1980 ) applies here too: in the extreme cases where all the market participants are equally informed or the price system is fully informative, there would be no trade and the market collapses; on the other hand, if none of the market participants is informative, the market doesn't work. At either extreme, the market system fails in aggregating and revealing information.
14 From this point onward, we will keep to the transformed compensation function.
information role in the manager's contracting process. Another benefit of usingP is that it is more intuitive. One way to interpret equation (19) is that besides the realized payoff,r, the principal also observes and contracts the manager's compensation on another zero-mean signal,P . Note that at equilibrium,P is informationally equivalent to the stock price P .
That is, we have V ar(P ) = V ar(P ) and Corr(δ,P ) = Corr(δ, P ).
Given the compensation contract W =â + b 1 r + b 2P , the manager solves the following problem:
The first-order condition yields
At equilibrium the manager's individual rationality condition should be binding, so we havê
Or,â
With W =â + b 1 r + b 2P , the principal's problem can be rewritten as
for e and equation (23) forâ. The above problem is therefore simplified as
The first-order conditions yield
Plugging Cov(δ,P ) = ρV 1 2 δ V ar(P ) 1 2 into equation (26), we easily have
Plugging
back into equation (25), we obtain
where ρ is given in equation (14) .
Given equation (27) , the transformed compensation function given in (19) could be rewritten as:
could be viewed as an aggregate index which is built on two performance measures. The compensation scheme in our model, therefore, is based on an aggregate performance measure that captures various aspects of a firm's performance. 15 Obviously, in our model, b 1 captures the sensitivity of incentive pay to the aggregate performance measure.
Immediately, we obtain:
Proposition 2 In the rational expectations equilibrium, the optimal pay-for-performance sensitivity, b * 1 , is given by
Clearly from equation (30), we have
< 0, and
2 ) is that V ar(δ|P ) captures the informativeness of stock price (Kyle 1985) . It is therefore intuitively appealing. We have:
The pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases with the manager effort parameter k, risk aversion parameter γ, and the (inverse) measure of stock price informativeness, V ar(δ|P ).
Further, using Lemma 2 and equation (30), we show Proposition 3 (1) The more costly it is to collect information about firm performance, the less sensitive is pay to performance (
(2) Given the number of informed traders N , the more volatile the cash flow, the less sensitive is pay to performance (
(3) Given the number of informed traders N , the more dispersed are the informed investors' opinions (or the less informative of the performance signal), the less sensitive is pay to performance (
Combining Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, we conclude:
The pay-for-performance sensitivity depends monotonically and positively upon the market informativeness which increases with the number of informed traders. Moreover, the equilibrium number of informed traders hinges on various market microstructure characteristics.
Empirical Implications
The key prediction from the model is that the more informative the stock prices, the more effective the compensation scheme in inducing managers' incentives. The effectiveness of the contract is measured by the value of the pay-for-performance sensitivity. The core hypothesis for the empirical study is:
H1: The pay-for-performance sensitivity increases with respect to the market informativeness.
To implement the empirical testing, though, we need to come up with some measure of the market informativeness. A couple of variables can be used to proxy for the stock price transmission. Overall, all other things being equal, the more analyst coverage, the quicker the rate of information transmission, hence the more informative the market is. Based on those findings, we use the analyst coverage to proxy for the market informativeness. 16 Hypothesis H1 can be rewritten as:
H1': The pay-for-performance sensitivity increases with respect to the analyst coverage.
We focus on testing Hypothesis H1' in the empirical part of this paper. 16 Conceptually, liquidity and transparency are good candidates to proxy for market informativeness too. However, no variables exist in the market to directly measure them. Variables like the bid-ask spread, trading frequency, trading volume, and trade reporting rules are used to proxy for either liquidity or transparency. In this aspect, we believe that the analyst coverage variable corresponds more directly to the market informativeness than the other variables. we set the coverage to zero. Based on all those data, we construct a data set containing 2,359 unique firms and 12,304 CEO-year observations for the empirical study. All monetary terms are in 1992 constant dollars to remove the effect of inflation on the empirical study.
CEO Compensation Data
We use several variables to measure different layers of CEO compensation structure. The total current compensation (TCC) is the sum of salary and bonus. The total direct (or flow) compensation (TDC1) is defined as the sum of total current compensation, other annual short-term compensation, payouts from long-term incentive plans, the Black-Scholes value of stock options granted, the value of restricted stocks granted and all other long-term compensation. Both TCC and TDC1 measure the payment a CEO directly receives from the employing firm within one fiscal year.
Neither of the above two measures considers the change in compensation that a CEO indirectly derives from a change in the value of stocks and options already granted to him in previous years. Murphy (1999) The first six rows of Table 1 
summarize information about various CEO compensation
18 This is not a perfect measure of the value of the previously-granted options as it only considers the option value when they are in-the-money. Those out-of-the-money options that expire in future years still have a time value in the current year. Although this proxy underestimates the overall value of the previouslygranted options and hence the accordingly calculated compensations, it serves a conservative benchmark for our measure of pay-for-performance sensitivity. Some more precise reevaluation methods have been proposed in the literature (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999; Hall and Liebman, 1998; and Murphy, 1999). 19 Caution has been exercised in the empirical analysis to try to minimize the effect of other outliers.
Shareholder Return and Accounting Data
The standard measure of CEO incentives is pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), defined by Jensen and Murphy (1990) as the total change in CEO wealth per $1,000 change in shareholder value. The change in shareholder value (VCHANGE) is further defined as the rate of return realized by shareholders within the period multiplied by the beginning-ofperiod market value. For the empirical study, stock return data from CRSP are matched with firms covered in ExecuComp.
Rows 7-11 of To control for the impact of the firm-specific characteristics, firm-level accounting data are also extracted from COMPUSTAT. As a measure of a firm's growth opportunities, Tobin's q is calculated as the ratio between the market value of assets and their book value (data 6), where the market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the book value of common equity (data 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (data 74). As displayed in row 12 of Table 1 , the average Tobin's q of those firms is 2.11 with a standard deviation of 1.95 (and median is 1.50). The range of q is as low as 0.32 and as high as 45.33. Net sales and total assets, two alternative measures of firm size, are reported in row 13 and row 14, respectively.
Analyst Coverage Data
To measure the informativeness of the markets, we use the analyst coverage as the proxy for the rate of information flow. Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) report that stocks with analyst coverage adjust more quickly to common information than stocks without coverage. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) illustrate that the firm-specific information of those firms with high analyst coverage tends to move more quickly across the investing public than that of firms with low coverage. It has been well-accepted in literature that the more analyst coverage, the quicker the rate of (public and private) information transmission, hence the more informative the market is.
Row 15 of Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the coverage variable. COV is the log value of one plus the number of analysts covering the firm within one fiscal year.
The mean and median of coverage are 1.73 and 2.08, roughly equivalent to 5 and 7 analysts, respectively. The minimum coverage is 0 and the maximum 4.14 (or about 62 analysts covering firms within one fiscal year).
Empirical Methodology
The empirical model in this paper is rooted in the methods of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Jensen and Murphy (1990) and others. We use the following model to test Hypothesis H1 :
Were w it denotes the change in a CEO's firm-related wealth while employed by firm i in year t, hence w is DTOTW, and dummies stand for industry and year dummies.
In equation (31), we control for several empirically-relevant variables: firm size, return volatility, growth opportunity, industry effect and year effect. It's an empirical regularity that both the compensation level and the pay-for-performance sensitivity are related to firm size (Baker and Hall, 2002; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; and Schaefer, 1998) . Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) find that dollar return variability plays a key role in explaining some of the heterogeneity in stock-based pay-for-performance sensitivities. Smith and Watts (1992) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) report that growth opportunity is a significant factor in explaining differences in managerial compensation. Many studies have documented the presence of industry effects and year effects (Ely, 1991; and Murphy, 1999) . To address the well-documented cross-sectional variations in the pay-for-performance sensitivity, we explicitly interact the shareholder dollar return with both the firm size and return volatility in the above regression specification.
To test the positive relationship between the pay-for-performance sensitivity and the market informativeness as predicted in our theory, we use the variable COV and its interaction term with VCHANGE to control for any heterogeneity in PPS beyond that attributed to firm size, return variability, growth opportunity, industry effect and year effect.
If the heterogeneity of PPS does not depend on the market informativeness, the coefficient β 1 associated with the interaction term is zero. Thus, in this framework, testing Hypothesis H1 (or Hypothesis H1') is equivalent to testing the following hypothesis:
However, as documented in previous studies, the extent of analyst coverage depends on several firm characteristics, firm size in particular (e.g, Bhushan, 1989 ). Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) also find that firm size is the most dominant single factor explaining analyst coverage. We follow their approach to control for the influence of size and other variables on analyst coverage by using residual analyst coverage, which is obtained by regressing the variable COV (i.e., the log value of one plus the number of analysts) against firm size, market-to-book ratio, turnover ratio, NASDAQ dummy, leverage ratio, industry dummies and year dummies. 21 The last row of Table 1 summarizes the residual coverage obtained from such a regression. We then apply the residual coverage (RESCOV) in place of COV in equation (31) for our empirical study.
Moreover, from equation (31), we can calculate the imputed pay-performance sensitivity as β 0 +β 1 rescov it +β 2 size it +β 3 annvol it for a CEO of firm i in period t. Clearly, the imputed PPS profile is a linear function of the following three variables: rescov, size and annvol. β 0 measures the intercept of the PPS profile while β 1 , β 2 and β 3 capture the responses of the profile to changes in the three variables. Also, holding fixed firm size and return volatility, the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the PPS is entirely explained by the cross-section variations in (residual) coverage. 
Statistical Evidence
The upper half of Table 2 reports the parameter estimates from the three types of regressions of equation (31) . The intercept part of the imputed pay-for-performance sensitivity, β 0 , is 21 Due to the quite high correlation between firm size and coverage, the use of residual analyst coverage helps to avoid the multi-collinearity problem that would otherwise occur in estimating equation (31) . For brevity, we do not report the residual analyst coverage regression results in the text. The most significant and dominant variable to explain analyst coverage is firm size, followed by turnover, NASDAQ dummy and leverage. Details are available upon request. 22 A robust regression begins by screening out and eliminating gross outliers based on OLS regression results, and then iteratively performs weighted regressions on the remaining observations until the maximum change in weights falls below a pre-set tolerance level, say 1%. estimated to be 45.924 (OLS), 7.514 (median) and 9.912 (robust), respectively. All are statistically significant. This implies that a $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth leads to at least a $7.514 increase in the CEO's total compensation package, if there are no interactions of shareholder wealth with other variables. The magnitude of β 0 decreases significantly from the OLS regression to the robust regression then to the median regression.
The median regression and the robust regression estimates are quite similar to each other. This phenomenon is also observed for virtually all the other parameter estimates. Despite the fact that all three types of regressions address the outlier problem, the above pattern seems to suggest that the median regression and the robust regression do a better job than the OLS regression in dealing with the severe skewness effect in model estimation.
The interaction term vhange * size has a significantly negative parameter across all regressions, verifying that the pay-performance sensitivity is negatively and strongly correlated with the firm size, even taking into account the recent three years of observations (1999) (2000) (2001) . 23 The negative size effect on the PPS can partly be explained by the fact that a CEO in a larger firm has difficulty in acquiring a large percentage of shares either directly or indirectly through stock and option grants (Baker and Hall, 2002 ).
There is a strong and significantly positive relationship between the return volatility and the PPS. This may be because the option value increases with respect to the volatility of the underlying asset and a CEO with a larger weight of option grant in her compensation package prefers a more volatile asset performance to take advantage of such option property, other things being equal. 24 Core and Guay (1999) find that firms tend to use new grants of equity incentives (options and stocks) to reward CEOs' past performance and to re-optimize incentives for future performance.
There are two interesting findings on the role of the residual coverage in managerial 23 The majority of the empirical studies reporting this result employ a sample of only up to the end of 1998.compensation. Firstly, the estimated coefficient β 4 for residual coverage RESCOV is negative in all three regression methods, and it is strongly significant in either the median regression (at the 1% level) or the robust regression (at the 2% level). Though insignificant at the 5% level, the OLS estimate of β 4 is still significant at the 7% level. The negative and significant β 4 illustrates a negative relationship between the coverage and the level of CEO compensation. That is, a higher coverage is associated with a lower compensation level.
Given that the residual coverage has already controlled for such confounding variables as various firm characteristics, industry and year effects, the negative relationship between coverage and compensation level is less likely to be driven by those variables. Therefore, the negative relationship seems to suggest that the level of market informativeness as proxied by the residual coverage helps to curb the level of executive pay. When the market is more informative, it is probably easier to exert pressure on CEOs, ensuring that they do not expropriate rents from shareholders in the form of excess compensation. In light of this, the result implies that the market monitors CEOs and structures their behavior. Interestingly, despite the magnitude differences, for each of the parameter estimates β 0 , β 1 , β 2 and β 3 , their signs and statistical significance are consistent with each other using any regression method. Even for the parameter β 3 which is associated with the residual coverage, its sign is consistent and its statistical significance is comparable to the others.
In other words, our estimation results and inferences are independent of the estimation methodology. Furthermore, our results are robust to the inclusion of net sales and total assets as alternative firm size proxies, and the squared market capitalization as one control for possible nonlinearities in the data, as well as different cutoff levels for data winsorization of DTOTW and VCHANGE (say at the top and bottom one percentile). The results are qualitatively very similar. (Those alternative specifications are suppressed for the sake of brevity.) All these trials provide evidence of the robustness of our results.
Economic Significance
To gauge the economic significance of the positive coefficient β 1 , we conduct the following analysis. From equation (31), we have the pay-for-performance sensitivity given by β 0 + β 1 rescov it + β 2 size it + β 3 annvol it for a CEO of firm i in period t. Everything else equal, the sensitivity difference between the maximum-covered firm and the minimum-covered firm is β 1 (rescov max,it − rescov min,it ).
The lower half of Table 2 reports the pay-for-performance sensitivity measure for the least-, median-, and most-covered firms, assuming the median firm size and the median return volatility. With a median coverage, the imputed PPS is $43.335, $9.799 and $8.281
per $1,000 increase in the shareholder wealth from the OLS, median and robust regressions, respectively. These estimates are consistent with previous studies of similar data (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Milbourn, 2002; Murphy, 1999; and Schaefer, 1998) . The imputed sensitivities for the least-covered firms are $19.847, $9.487 and $7.618 per $1,000 increase in the shareholder wealth from the OLS, median and robust regressions, respectively.
For the most-covered firms, the corresponding imputed sensitivities are $62.297, $10.052 and $8.816 per $1,000 increase in the shareholder wealth. Based on the OLS regression, this represents a 213.88% net increase in the imputed PPS from the minimum to the maximum coverage. Equivalently, the imputed PPS increases by 103.24% per 1% increase in coverage.
Though the magnitude in differences seems not strikingly large from the median and robust regressions, it respectively represents a 5.96% and 15.73% net increase in the PPS with the coverage, which can be further translated into an average of 2.88% and 7.59% increase in the PPS for every 1% increase in the coverage.
Sub-sample Study
To further examine the relationship between the analyst coverage and the pay-forperformance sensitivity, we divide the whole sample into two sub-groups: firms with and without coverage (That is, n > 0 and n = 0, respectively, where n is the number of analysts.)
For each subgroup, the empirical model is specified as:
The estimated pay-for-performance sensitivity is given as β 0 + β 2 size it + β 3 annvol it for a CEO of firm i in period t. Table 3 reports the three types of regression results for the two subsamples. Clearly, all estimated parameters are statistically significant at the 1% level. Like the whole-sample study, for each subsample, the patterns of parameter estimates are consistent across the three regression methods. No matter whether covered or not, the pay-for-performance sensitivity profile has a positive intercept, β 0 , a negative load on firm size, β 2 , and a positive load on stock return volatility, β 3 . In particular, the cross-sectional variations in firm size have a negative impact on the cross-sectional heterogeneity in PPS. This pattern identified from the subsample study does not depend on the estimation method employed, and it is the same as the pattern observed from the whole-sample study.
Interestingly, except for the OLS regression method, if we compare the magnitude of estimated β 2 and β 3 from the uncovered and covered groups with those from the whole sample, we see that each coefficient estimate in the uncovered group is smaller than its corresponding estimate in the whole sample which is smaller still than that of the covered group. The pattern holds for the estimate of β 3 even from the OLS regression method.
We also compare the estimate of β 0 , associated with the vchange variable, between the two subsamples. Both the median and robust regressions render a much larger estimate for the covered group than the uncovered group. The parameter estimates are 8.958 (10.213) in the covered group versus 6.716 (5.400) in the uncovered group using the median (robust) regression. A single-sided test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients β 0 are the same across the two subsamples in favor of the alternative that the covered group has a larger estimate of β 0 than the uncovered group. Holding fixed the firm size and stock return volatility, the covered group displays a uniformly higher PPS than the uncovered group.
Assuming the median size and median return volatility, we calculate the imputed pay- for the uncovered group. The covered group exhibits a 104.53%, 24.05% and 32.24% increase in the PPS than the uncovered group from the OLS, median and robust regressions, respectively. Under the null hypothesis, the imputed sensitivity difference should be equal to zero. Instead, the respective difference is 26.274, 2.154 and 2.091 from the OLS, median and robust regression and it is statistically significant. 25 The null that the difference equals zero is soundly rejected, even after the impact of firm size and return volatility on the measure of the pay-for-performance sensitivity has been controlled for. This result lends further support to our model prediction that the incentive measure PPS increases with the analyst coverage.
Summary and Conclusion
We examine in this paper under what circumstances the market-based compensation scheme is effective in inducing managers' incentives. Inspired by the findings that stock prices incorporate performance information which can't be extracted from firms' earnings data, we combine the compensation contract theory with the market microstructure literature and use a rational-expectation equilibrium concept to endogenize both the optimal compensation scheme and the stock market equilibrium. The stock market equilibrium is characterized by the stock price, the number of informed traders and traders' optimal bidding strategies.
The stock market works as an information aggregator through stock trading. The principal leverages information contained in stock prices to design the optimal contract.
We analytically show that the incentive pay works more effectively in a more efficient (or more informative) stock market. We also analytically show the following:
• The pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) increases as the number of informed traders increases;
• Given the number of informed traders, PPS decreases as the cost of becoming informed increases;
• Given the number of informed traders, PPS decreases as the performance signal turns less informative; and
• Given the number of informed traders, PPS decreases as the cash flow volatility increases.
We take the model prediction to data. Using the residual analyst coverage as one proxy for the market informativeness, we conduct several empirical tests and justify the key model prediction that the pay-for-performance sensitivity increases with respect to the market informativeness. In particular, we find a negative relationship between coverage and compensation level and a positive relationship between coverage and the pay-forperformance sensitivity. The negative relationship between coverage and compensation level suggests that the market informativeness proxied by the residual coverage helps to curb the level of executive pay. A more informative market makes it easier to exert pressure on CEOs, ensuring that they do not expropriate rents from shareholders in the form of excess compensation. The empirical analysis thus implies that an efficient market induces managerial incentives as well as structures their behavior.
One natural extension of this paper is to conduct a cross-country analysis. The marketbased compensation scheme is far less popular in non-US areas (like Europe and East Asia) than in the US. What can explain the cross-country variations? Our model suggests that different degrees of stock market informativeness, which depends on various characteristics of market microstructure, offer one possible explanation. Thus, legal environment (e.g., investor protection, trading rule, etc.) and cultural background play an important role.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2: Substituting equation (5) into equation (13), we have
Using the implicit function theorem, we get
Proof of Lemma 3: (1) Given that P = e+λω, we have V ar(P ) = λ 2 V ar(ω). Substituting
(β i ) + z into the expression and using equation (10), we immediately have
. Plug equation (15) into the equation, we can simplify
(3) Based on equations (14) and (15), we have V ar(P ) = ρ 2 V δ .
Proof of Proposition 3:
(1) Equation ( (2) Similarly, from equation (16) , given N , we have
(3) Again, from equation (16) , given N , we get NUGRNT is the sum of the Black-Scholes value of newly granted stock options and the value of newly granted restricted stocks. All compensation data are in thousands of dollars. MKTVAL is the fiscal-year-end market capitalization of a firm's equity (in millions of dollars). Size is the log value of MKTVAL. The change in the firm's market value within the fiscal year (VCHANGE) is calculated as the percentage stock returns times the market capitalization of equity as of the beginning of the fiscal year (in millions of dollars). Stock return (ANNRET) is the annualized percentage return for the firm over its fiscal year. The annualized percentage volatility of stock returns (ANNVOL) is computed using the past five years of monthly stock return data. Tobin's Q is calculated as the ratio between the market value of assets and the book value of assets (data 6), where the market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the book value of common equity (data 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (data 74). Coverage (COV) is the log value of one plus the number of unique analysts covering the firm within one fiscal year. Residual analyst coverage (RESCOV) is the residual from regressing COV against firm size, market-to-book ratio, turnover ratio, NASDAQ dummy, leverage ratio, industry dummies and year dummies. Nobs is the number of non-missing observations. DTOTW and VCHANGE are winsorized such that the top (bottom) three values are set to the fourth largest (smallest) value. All monetary variables are in 1992 constant dollars. The top half of this table presents the regression results of changes in CEO firm-related wealth (DTOTW) against shareholder dollar return (VCHANGE), the interaction of VCHANGE and the residual analyst coverage (RESCOV), the interaction of VCHANGE and the firm size (SIZE), the interaction of VCHANGE and the firm's stock return volatility (ANNVOL), residual coverage, firm size, stock return volatility, Tobin's q, industry dummies and year dummies.
Residual analyst coverage are the residuals from regressing the log value of one plus the number of analysts against firm size, market-to-book ratio, share turnover, NASDAQ dummy, industry dummies and year dummies. DTOTW, VCHANGE, RESCOV, SIZE, ANNVOL, and Tobin's q are described in This table presents the regressions of changes in CEO's firm-related wealth (DTOTW) against shareholder dollar return (VCHANGE), the interaction of VCHANGE and firm size (SIZE), the interaction of VCHANGE and the firm's stock return volatility (ANNVOL), firm size, stock return volatility, Tobin's q, industry dummies and year dummies for the two subsamples: with and without analyst coverage. DTOTW, VCHANGE, SIZE, ANNVOL and Tobin's q are described in Table 1 , and n denotes the number of analysts. 
